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They all thought they had finished, 
but in truth they had not even begun. 
Aldo Schiavone, The End of the Past (p. 134) 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
 How unequal is Europe? With the advent and enlargement of the European Union, we have 
a pretty good idea. The EU27 Gini coefficient has reached the level of the United States. The same 
question can be asked for the earlier periods: just before World War I, at the beginning of the 
Industrial Revolution, in the Middle Ages, in Late Antiquity, all the way to the beginning of the 
Common Era.  
 
 But the answer is not as easy. In order to answer it, we need to dispose of two crucial pieces 
of information: an estimate of average incomes in all political units (countries or regions) that 
compose Europe at a given point in time, and an estimate of inequality within each of these units.  
Both are crucial, and neither is forthcoming.  The former  (how different are mean incomes?) deals 
with similarity or not in average living conditions across Europe, and thus with, what is called in 
growth economics, income convergence or divergence. It is an immensely important issue. How 
significant it is, may be best appreciated with reference to the on-going discussion regarding the EU 
enlargement. The EU27 has caught up  in inequality with the United States because of the 
enlargement towards the Eastern areas of the continent which have significantly lower mean 
incomes. Thus, in 2007, after Bulgaria and Romania (and previously eight other post-Communist 
countries) became members of the European Union, the EU-wide Gini coefficient (across all 
individuals in the area) reached 41 points which is about the same as the Gini calculated across all 
individuals in the United States. The difference however is that in the former case, most of 
inequality is driven by mean income differences between the member-states. If we take  EU15 the 
Gini coefficient is only 33, about the same as the median Gini of the fifteen countries and 
significantly less than US inequality. In other words, the European Union  is unequal because the 
level of development in its Western and Eastern halves  is unequal, not because each individual 
member-country is unequal. 
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  The finding has numerous political and economic implications: whether to enhance the 
European cohesion mostly by transfers of funds from rich to poor countries, or  by allowing free 
movement of labor, or by insisting on deeper institutional changes in the new member countries. 
Also, what to do with the possibly forthcoming members, such as Turkey, that are populous and 
poor? 1 
 
 The objective of this paper is to set a baseline for a similar discussion of the Euro-
Mediterranean region in a period that ranges from the end of  Augustus‟ rule to the conquest of  the 
Southern Mediterranean shores by Islam. It is, as  conventionally regarded,  a  period that 
encompasses  the peak of power, and possibly prosperity, of the Empire, its largest territorial 
expansion which, like the European Union today, created an almost single market with a single 
currency (with the notable exception of Egypt) where goods, people and capital moved relatively 
easily and were subject to similar laws, had extended citizenship to all individuals under its rule, but 
had also ultimately witnessed the fall and the dissolution of the Western part of this single economic 
space and its replacement by a number of independent kingdoms.  
 
 The data for this exercise  are understandably very sparse. However, I believe that the 
contours are worth trying to draw so that other pieces of information can be either fitted within the 
proposed empirical narrative, or used to improve it, or perhaps to reject it and replace it with a  
more sensible one. The exercise should be viewed also as a part of a larger endeavor  whose aim 
would be ambitious, namely to present a  history of global inequality between political entities and 
ultimately individuals in the world. It is a difficult project to do but breaking it into more 
manageable pieces, for example by (i)  large regions like the Euro-Mediterranean, and (as we shall do 
here) (ii) by expressing incomes in terms of subsistence, might just make it feasible. It should be also 
kept in mind that by covering the Euro-Mediterranean region, one includes (in  the beginning of the 
first century) between 20 and 30 percent of  the then existing world population, and possibly more 
of global income. 2 These are not small shares.  In taking the regional approach, and combining 
                                                          
1 The accession of Turkey alone to the current EU27 would raise the overall Gini by 3 points, or by almost eight 
percent.  
 
2  The median range for the Roman population in the beginning of the first century, is 50 to 60 million. World 
population is reckoned to have been 200 to 300 million (see van Zanden, 2003, p. 3 ). Maddison (2008, Table 1.12, p. 54) 
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regional results into an overall whole, one would replicate the way that progress has been made in 
some contemporary studies, in particular those of relative national price levels (PPPs). They were 
originally calculated for OECD countries only, and then later, including today, are done by region,  
with each region linked to the others, so that at the end we get a global picture as a summation, or 
juxtaposition, of the regional ones.  
 
 
2. Regional and overall average incomes 
 
 Roman imperial incomes have been estimated in four "currencies": in local monetary units 
(Goldsmith 1984, Temin 2003), in wheat-equivalents (Scheidel and Friesel, 2009),  in modern 
international dollars (Maddison 2008; Milanovic, Williamson and Lindert, henceforth MLW 2009), 
and in subsistence. The latter estimation was, explicitly or implicitly, done by all the cited authors.  It 
is also the estimation technique that we shall use here. Once everything is expressed in subsistence, it 
is an easy task to price the subsistence in modern international dollars, whether as $PPP 300 or 
$PPP 400, and "translate"  Roman incomes into current prices, and thus open the door to a 
comparison with the estimates of the average income in the Middle Age Europe or in modern times 
.   
 Almost all  Roman income estimates are related to, or based on, Goldsmith's (1984) estimate 
for the year 14 (at the death of Augustus). Goldsmith estimated the average annual per capita 
income and  expenditures to be HS 380 (HS=sesterces).  MLW take Goldsmith's  estimate and, 
using various assumptions about the minimum consumption needs and price of wheat, arrive at the 
minimum subsistence basket costed at HS 180. Thus their average income is 2.11 times the 
subsistence.  Maddison also takes Goldsmith's mean income estimate as given while revising 
components (labor income, elite income, investment) and the population of the Empire.  He 
converted the estimated mean income of  HS 380 into 1990 Geary-Khamis international dollars 
through comparison of the Roman income with the average income for the 1688 England contained 
in Gregory King's social table. The purchasing power of HS 380 in terms of wheat and gold was 
related to the purchasing power of England's mean income in 1688 in terms of the same two 
commodities. In terms of gold, Roman income turns out  to be equal to 38 percent of 1688 England 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
uses a "low-count" for Roman Empire (44 million) which this still gives 20 percent of the world population total used by   
the same author (226 million, Table 2.1, p. 70). 
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while in terms of wheat, it is equal to 42.3 percent of England's income (Maddison, 2008, pp. 51-52). 
Maddison takes an approximate average of the two (40 percent) which then yields $PPP 571. Since 
subsistence is assumed by Maddison  to be $PPP 400, his Roman income estimate is 1.42 
subsistence.  
 
 For the year 150, we use the mean income estimate derived from Scheidel and Friesen (2009) 
imperial income distribution. Scheidel and Friesen (as we shall discuss in Section 4)  are concerned 
with both average income and income distribution. They provide estimates in wheat-equivalents for 
13 income classes 3 Their estimated average income is 707  wheat-equivalent kg, which using their 
own estimated subsistence minimum of 390 kg of wheat-equivalent, translates into a mean income 
equal to 1.8 subsistence. 4 
 
 The next link in the chronological chain leads us to the time of Diocletian's Price Edict 
issued in 301.  Allen (2007) has used the data on prices and wages contained in the Edict to estimate 
real wage.  He finds that the unskilled real wage was 1.2 times Allen's own defined "bare bones 
subsistence minimum" for the family of 4, the ratio  which is about the same as for unskilled wage in 
India around  1820 or in China around 1870 (see Allen 2007, Figure 3). Assuming wage-to-GDP per 
capita ratio to have been the same in Rome as in the other two countries, this gives  mean income of 
1.33 subsistence minima.5  An alternative derivation of the mean would use Bairoch's (1977) "rule", 
namely the idea that the average per capita income in preindustrial societies is equal to about 200 
daily wages of an unskilled male worker. To go from Allen's real wage to Bairoch's mean income, we 
                                                          
3 This is strictly speaking true only for  nine non-elite income classes. For the top four income classes, incomes are given 
in monetary units, but monetary units can be converted into wheat-equivalents using Scheidel and Friesen preferred 
average price of wheat of 2.5 HS per modius.  
 
4 There is some confusion regarding the calculated mean income. In Scheidel and Friesen (2009, Table 4), the upper 
bound of mean income is given as  604 kg of wheat-equivalent. However, when we translate their own income 
distribution data in wheat-equivalents, and use their "optimistic" scenario regarding the distribution of recipients, the 
mean is 707 kg of wheat-equivalent (see Section 4 below). The latter estimate seems preferable because it is based on 
very detailed distribution data while the former estimate (income up to 604 kg of wheat-equivalent) is obtained more 
coarsely from the GDP income side alone. The 707 kg estimate  is also consistent with their own statement that the 
estimated mean income is "around $700" (p.74) in 1990 Maddison-used international dollars. 1.8 times the subsistence 
(at $PPP 400) is indeed close to that figure ($PPP 720), while 604 kg translates into only $PPP 619 (604/390*400).  
 
5 Maddison (2007) GDP estimate per capita for India in 1820 is $PPP 533, and for China in 1870, $PPP 530. These 
amounts divided by the subsistence of $PPP 400 yield 1.33.  
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also need the employment rate. We can use Goldsmith (1984) assumption of 40 percent.6  The 
resulting mean income works out to be barely above subsistence. 7 
 
 The following step is more complicated. Ward-Perkins (2005), provides a graph (Figure  6.1, 
p.122) where average incomes are displayed for five regions of the Empire (and later, after the fall  
of the Western Empire, for the five geographical  regions): North Africa, Italy, Roman Britain, 
Aegean "world",  and Levant. His graph  shows the estimates (or more exactly, the   guesstimates) 
covering the period 300-700. The lines are continuous, but are centered around the centennial years. 
The vertical axis displays the level of "economic complexity" ranging from "minimal" to 
"considerable". We can readily assume that the minimal economic complexity, which we denote by 
M,  coincides with an average income level that is at, or around, subsistence. However, the graph is 
unlabeled and it is not unambiguously clear to what income level does the top, or loosely speaking, 
the "considerable economic complexity" (denoted C) achieved in late antiquity, correspond. Yet we 
can set some ranges to the possible C. It can be reasonably thought to lie between a little over 1 and 
3  times the subsistence--for certainly no estimate of mean income in antiquity rises to the level 
above thrice the subsistence.8 In addition, we know--and this is crucial--that Allen's mean income for 
year 301 must equal the average for practically the same year (300) derived from Ward-Perkins' 
regional data (weighted by their population shares).  In other words,  
 
(1)       
i
ii
i
ii MsOsM   
where μ = estimated all-Empire mean income based on Allen (μ=1.33), si = share of i-th region in 
total population, Oi = the height of the ordinate in Ward-Perkins' graph.  The height of the ordinate 
for each region can be expressed as the multiple (γi) of the minimum level of economic complexity 
(M). When we set the top of the graph to be equal to a certain number of Ms, all γi are uniquely 
                                                          
6 Maintained by Madison (2008, pp.47 and 61) although he breaks total population into free (with lower employment 
ratio) and slaves (10 percent of the population, with a higher employment ratio).The overall number  however comes to 
40 percent.  
 
7 Obtained as 1.2 (Allen‟s result) multiplied by 4 (assumed household size) multiplied  by 0.4 (employment rate) 
multiplied by 200 (Bairoch's rule) and divided by 365 days. The result is 1.05 subsistence. 
 
8 "From early Greece to the early modern Europe of the ancient regime, incomes have never been much more than 
three times subsistence..." (Jongman, 2008, p. 594). See also a similar statement several pages later (ibid, p. 600) or in 
Bowman and Wilson (2009, p.45).  
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determined. But they also need to be such that equation (1) is satisfied. It turns out that only when 
Ward-Perkins' "considerable" complexity (top of the graph) is assumed to be 1.44 times the 
subsistence, does the weighted average of  the geographical incomes in his graph produce an overall 
mean income μ=1.33 in year 300.  Once we thus know the top and the bottom of the graph, we can 
easily convert the values given in the graph for the later years (400 to 700) into comparable multiples 
of the same subsistence minimim. The results of this exercise, together with the average income 
values  for the years 14, 150 and 300, are shown in Table 1 (see the last line) and Figure 1.9 
 
 In the calculations, Allen's 301 estimate is the crucial "hinge" on whose value the rest 
depends. If 301 estimate is lower (as implied, for example, by the use of Bairoch's "rule"), then the 
decline over the period 400-700 must be less because by 300, the average income has already fallen 
as low as the subsistence "floor". If, on the other hand, the estimate for 301 is higher, then the 
decline over the subsequent period can be steeper (there is more "space" to fall). This is because at 
the end of the period (in year 700), income is barely above subsistence under any scenario. One or 
the other assumption for the income level in 301 has nevertheless clear implications for how 
disastrous (or not wholly so) we judge the post-300 period to have been.  
 
 Several things need to be noted. First, Ward-Perkins provides regional averages which enable 
us, by calculating the overall imperial mean, to link his estimates to Allen's value obtained for the 
year 301. These regional averages (transformed into multiples of the subsistence thanks to the 
calibration exercise explained above) are also shown in Table 1. Second, in order to complete the 
regional picture,  I  have added to the Ward-Perkins' five regions, the sixth region (strangely 
omitted): Iberia and Gaul.  To keep things simple, I have assumed that its mean income follows 
during the years 300-700 the same pattern as the mean income for Italy. Third, other than the 
Empire-wide mean income estimate for the year 14, Maddison (2008) also provides regional 
averages for the same year.  I have "squeezed" Maddison's estimates provided for fourteen regions 
into the regional classification given by Ward-Perkins. (The regional "allocation" is explained in the 
                                                          
9 I calculate also the regional incomes and the overall mean for the year 520 because Ward-Perkins graphs show for that 
period  an income  increase for both the Aegean world and the Levant. 
 
8 
 
Notes to Table 1.) 10  We thus obtain relatively complete regional income estimates for the period 
14-700 which we shall use in the next Section to compute regional inequality.   
 
Figure 1. Estimated average per capita income in the Euro-Mediterranean region, 
years 14-700 
 
Note: Datum for 14 based on Maddison (2008), solid line, or MLW (2009), broken line. The other years explained in the 
text.  
 
 Using our central estimate, based on Maddison's (2008) value for the year 14, the overall 
pattern is of an increase in the average Euro-Mediterranean  income between 14 and 150, and then 
an equi-proportional decrease between years 150 and 300 (Figure 1). Afterwards, there is a steady, 
although not as sharp decline. These values are, of course, rough approximations but to get an idea 
of the estimated change, we note that between years 14 and 150, the overall mean income per capita 
rose by 27 percent (an average rate of growth of 0.16 percent p.a.), while in the next century and a 
half, it dropped by about as much. If we use the MLW (2009) value for the year 14, the picture is  
different because a rapid decline sets in from the very beginning  and continues all the way to 300. 
Moreover, the relative merits of the two periods (early vs. the Late Empire and dissolution) are now 
                                                          
10 This is the reason why in Table 1, I show Maddison's estimate for the year 14 rather than MLW estimate.  
1
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reversed. It is over the first period that the decline was faster. After 300, it continued but at a slower 
pace.  In either case, at the end of the period (around 700), the overall mean income had declined to 
the level  only about 15 percent above the subsistence.   
   
  Discussion.  Is the income pattern depicted in Table 1 and Figure 1 plausible? Three  
important points have to be kept in mind. First, there is a conventional view that  income in the 
Euro-Mediterranean region might have reached its peak in the  first century, and perhaps even later 
(as implied by one set of data here), around mid-second century. Although each individual 
documentary piece of evidence (distribution of shipwrecks, size of domestic animals, construction of 
public buildings, concentration of lead in ice caps, attestation of water-lifting devices in literary 
sources, number of surviving manuscripts, fish-salting  capacity) can be dated somewhat differently 
and explained by various  causes and not necessarily as being indicative of an income peak achieved 
in the first century or at its close, the sheer accumulation of the evidence and its apparent broad 
chronological coincidence end up by being  compelling. 11 After marshalling most of this evidence, 
Jongman (2008, p. 616) concludes: "The tide seems to have turned in the late second century AD, 
possibly as a result of the  Antonine Plague". One need not subscribe to that particular causal 
explanation though, to hold the view that the period around 14-150 (the latter date seems the 
furthest reasonable end-point) might have represented the high water-mark of the Euro-
Mediterranean preindustrial prosperity.  
 
 It is not inconceivable that the most disastrous period started just after 150 and carried on 
until Diocletian's assumption of power (285) and his reforms. In view of what we know happened 
during that period:  the plagues, almost incessant civil war, low average duration of central power 
(emperors), warfare on the borders, high inflation, reversal to elements of natural economy, this 
seems plausible. Indeed, each of these factors existed before, but not all of them together, and not 
with the virulence they exhibited between the rules of Commodus and Diocletian. We know from 
research on growth in the last 20 years that all of these factors are associated with declines in real 
                                                          
11 See Ward-Perkins  (2005, Chapter V), Kehoe (2008), Jognman (2008, pp. 610-615),  Bowman and Wilson (2009, p. 37-
42), Wilson (2009). For a view that  income might have peaked at the time of the Augustan principate, see Scheidel 
(2008, 2009a, in particular pp. 13-23) and to some extent also Wilson (2009, pp. 226). According to Scheidel, further 
Roman growth, after a period of conquests, was anyway unsustainable due to lack of technological innovations (needed 
to keep per capita incomes rising while the population is growing). This is a view similar to that of Schiavone (2000).  
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growth or level of output: civil  wars and inflation are the obvious cases in point.12  Weak and 
unstable central power implies instability of institutional rules, another element associated with low 
modern growth.  
 
 Second, there seems to be a broad consensus that the average income declined in the Late 
Empire, and either continued on the downward path or remained low after the dissolution of the 
Western Empire. 13  That these two essential features (the peak between early first and mid-second 
century and steady decline afterwards) are present in the results is remarkable given that the data on 
which these calculations are based are in many (though not all) ways independent estimates from 
five  sources (Maddison;  Milanovic, Lindert and Williamson; Scheidel and Friesen; Allen; and Ward-
Perkins). What the sources have in common, and which enables our putting them together, is that 
they are based on expressing the mean as a multiple of the subsistence (or at leaat that such a 
multiple can be derived from them).  The (same) physiological subsistence minimum provides the 
numeraire which holds the whole edifice together. But even if the pattern seems  plausible, one must 
not interpret the exact years for which the data have been displayed as anything more than 
representing a very approximate dating, dating which must be inclusive of the  adjacent  decades. 
Even year 301 which directly corresponds to the data from Diocletian's Edict must be taken as 
representative of a longer period.  
 
 Third, regional income pattern revealed by Table 1 is interesting. The severest decline, by far,  
occurs in Italy, and it is fairly constant over time. The Aegean region appears to stay at the same 
income level until rather late in our period: it is only in 700 that the average income there is 
substantially lower than around the time of Diocletian‟s edict. North Africa reaches its peak in 400, 
and Levant in 520, by which time Peninsular Italy is barely above subsistence. Their income 
evolutions seems quite different from the one that traditionally attracts most attention, i.e., Italy and 
                                                          
12 See e.g. Barro (1997).  
13 For example, a recent volume on the quantification of  Roman economic history introduces its scope thus: "'[t]he 
chronological parameters are 100 BC-AD 350, covering the period of greatest imperial expansion and economic growth 
(to c. AD 200), followed by a century conventionally perceived as one of contraction or decline" (Bowman and Wilson, 
2009, p.3).  A recent popular book (Goldsworthy, 2009, pp. 144-5), puts it this way: "In the year 300 the economy of the 
Roman Empire was certainly more sophisticated and robust than anything that would be seen in the same regions for 
over a thousand years. Without statistics we cannot say how it compared to the conditions of the second century, but it 
is unlikely to have been stronger and most probably had declined, probably by a large margin".  
11 
 
Western Europe. Although the overall tendency is to the decline, the regional movements were not 
synchronized.  
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Table 1. Regional and overall average per capita income in the Euro-Mediterranean region, years 14-700 
(expressed in subsistence) 
 
Year 14 150 300 400 500 520 600 700 
 
North Africa 1.20  1.40 1.40 1.26 1.24 1.18 1.11 
Peninsular Italy 2.14  1.35 1.31 1.18 1.15 1.11 1.13 
Roman Britain 1.10  1.22 1.20 1.04 1.04 1.04 1.07 
Aegean world 1.30  1.31 1.31 1.35 1.37 1.31 1.11 
Levant 1.44  1.29 1.31 1.40 1.42 1.35 1.29 
Gaul and Iberia 1.20  1.35 1.31 1.18 1.15 1.11 1.13 
Total  1.42 1.81 1.33 1.32 1.28 1.29 1.24 1.15 
 
Note. Year 14: calculated from Maddison (2007, Table 1.12, p. 54). Year 150, calculated from Scheidel and Friesen (2009; based on Tables 6 and 8; see also Section 4 
below). Year 300: calculated from Allen's (2007) results for the year 301 and Maddison (2004).. Years 300-700 derived from Ward-Perkins (2007, Table 6.1) as 
explained in the text, Regional data from Maddison (2007, p.54) are "converted" into Ward-Perkins' classification as follows: Sicily, Sardinia, Corsica, Baetica, other 
Iberia, Narbonensis and other Gaul comprise Gaul and Iberia. Greece, Danubian provinces and Asia minor comprise the Aegean "world”. Tunisia, Libya, Algeria and 
Morocco are Roman North Africa.  Egypt, Greater Syria and Cyprus are the Levant. Peninsular Italy in both sources us the same. The population data (see Annex) are 
from Maddison (2007, Table 1.3., p. 37) and McEvady-Jones (1978).  
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3. Regional and overall inequality  
 Regional mean income estimates from Table 1 allow us to calculate  overall regional 
inequality. Table 2 shows that the gap between the richest and poorest region has tended to go 
down. In year 14, the gap between the richest region (Italy) and the poorest (Roman Britain) was 
almost 2 to 1. Afterwards, the gap never exceeded 1.4, and at the end of the period was 1.23. By 
then, the richest region was Levant, 14 and the poorest remained Britain, even if the difference 
between Britain and other European regions practically vanished.  They were all within the narrow 
range of 1.07 and 1.13 times the subsistence. The entire Euro-Mediterranean area, with the 
exception of Levant, was substantially poorer in year 700 than it was seven centuries earlier and 
average regional incomes were more similar. In other words, the impoverishment of the Euro-
Mediterranean region (with the exception of Levant) was generalized.  
 
 Moving toward an estimate of  inequality among individuals in the entire region, we can 
begin by calculating  population-weighted inequality from the regional data given above. Population-
weighted Gini represents an inter-personal Gini coefficient obtained on the assumption that all 
individuals in each region have the mean income of that region.15 In other words, it assumes that the 
entire source of inter-personal inequality is geographical (what is called "the between component") 
while  the "within component" (inequality within each region) is zero. Table 2 shows the results.  In 
year 14, population-weighted Gini was relatively high, at more than 10 Gini points. By years 300 and 
400, it has gone down to extremely small values around only 1 Gini point reflecting the fact  that the 
income gap between the regional mean incomes had all but vanished. Afterwards, the population-
weighted Gini rose somewhat but nevertheless stayed very  low.  
  
                                                          
14 Levant includes Egypt, Greater Syria and Cyprus. 
15 This is Concept 2 Gini as defined by Milanovic (2005).  
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Table 2. Some indicators of regional and inter-personal inequality in  
the Euro-Mediterranean region, years 14-700 
 
Year 14 300 400 500 520 600 700 
Relative gap 
(richest-to-
poorest) 
1.95 1.16 1.18 1.38 1.40 1.33 1.23 
Population-
weighted Euro-
Med Gini 
10.3 1.6 1.0 4.5 5.3 5.0 3.2 
Source: Calculated from Table 1. 
 
 Population-weighted Gini represents the lower bound of actual inter-personal inequality in 
the entire region. As explained, this is because its assumption is that within-inequality is non-existent 
(that is, all individuals have the mean income of their region). Luckily, we also have an estimate of 
maximum inter-personal inequality. Combining these two will therefore enable us to draw a band 
within which inter-personal inequality in the Euro-Mediterranean region must fall.  The maximum 
Gini is derived on the assumption that everybody in the entire Euro-Mediterranean region lives at 
the subsistence, and only a tiny (tending to infinitesimally small) percentage of the population 
appropriates the entire surplus above the subsistence. This maximum Gini is a function of mean 
income. If for example, mean income is just above the subsistence, then, however small the elite, the 
overall Gini cannot be very high because the actual income of that elite will also be quite limited.16 
The concept of the maximum feasible Gini was defined by Milanovic (2006), and more formally 
derived and studied in MLW (2009). The formula for the maximum feasible Gini is  
 
𝑀𝑎𝑥𝑖𝑚𝑢𝑚 𝐺𝑖𝑛𝑖 =
𝛼 − 1
𝛼
 
 
where α is the ratio between mean income and subsistence minimum. To calculate maximum Gini 
for the Euro-Mediterranean region as a whole we therefore apply the values from Table 1 (last row). 
                                                          
16 A helpful way to see why Gini must be limited is to recall that Gini is calculated as the sum of all bilateral income 
comparisons between individuals (scaled by the number of such comparisons and mean income): if almost all bilateral 
comparisons are zero (among all individuals who have the same, subsistence, income) and elite's income is limited 
(because of low overall income), Gini cannot be very high.  
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The results for upper- and lower-bound  Gini are shown in Figure 2. By the broken upper line (for 
the period 14-150), we also show the upper-bound Gini on the assumption of MLW value for mean 
income in year 14.  Two conclusions can be made.  
 
 First, inequality between individuals (and households) was likely to have been at its peak at 
about the same time when the mean income in the entire region was at the highest, possibly  around 
mid-second century.  
 
 Second, it is likely that inequality declined in the later centuries, and at the end of the period 
must have laid within a rather narrow range between 3 and 12 Gini points.  Such a low inequality 
(less than 12 Gini points) for a region that included about 26 million people is extremely unusual. 
Actually, we have no contemporary or historical examples of inequality that is so low. In the 
WIDER database, which is the largest compendium of post World War II income distribution 
statistics, it is only Bulgaria (in the late 1960s and mid-1970s), and Czech and Slovak republics (in 
the late 1980s, and probably before) that have Ginis under 19.17  The lowest recorded Gini is 15.9, 
and is almost certainly an underestimate.    
 
 This leaves us with several possibilities among which it is difficult or impossible to choose. 
First, our estimate of mean income might be biased downward. If true mean income was higher, 
then obviously, the maximum feasible (and thus perhaps, the actual) inequality could be greater. The 
second possibility is that the actual Gini might have exceeded the upper-bound Gini. This can occur 
only if the bulk of the population is at less than the subsistence. MLW (2009) note four  cases of 
countries where this appears to have been the case. They were all colonies, with the highest  
"inequality extraction ratio" (ratio between actual and maximum feasible inequality) of 113 percent 
in Moghul India around 1750, and 110 percent in Nueva España (Mexico) around 1790. The 
situation might have been the same or similar in the Euro-Mediterranean region between years 500 
and 700. This also implies a reduction of the population since life at less than subsistence is not 
possible. Finally, the third possibility is that income inequality was uniquely low in the Euro-
Mediterranean region. A fourth possibility represents a combination of the three listed above: mean 
                                                          
17 See http://www.wider.unu.edu/research/Database/en_GB/database/.  
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income might have been somewhat higher, a percentage of the population could not reproduce 
itself, and overall inequality, measured by the Gini, could have been very low. We simply lack 
information to choose between these different variants. However, as I shall argue below (contra most 
views), it may be possible  that inequality in the Late Empire and subsequently was indeed unusually 
low. 
 
Figure 2. Upper- and lower-bound Gini for inter-personal inequality in 
the Euro-Mediterranean region, years 14-700 
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4. Inter-personal inequality 
 
 For two years (14 and 150) we have direct estimates of inter-personal inequality based on 
social tables where salient income (or social) classes are listed with their estimated mean incomes 
and population shares. Such estimates were provided for the year 14 by MLW (2009, see Annex 2), 
and year 150 by Scheidel and Friesen (2009). Both use Goldsmith (1984) as the starting point for the 
estimate of elite incomes (senators, equestrian orders, and municipal decurions), and then make 
different assumptions regarding the incomes of the rest of the population, in particular for the 
income of the "middling groups".  MLW (2009) introduce a group of "other rich people" that comes 
in-between the elite and most of the population. Their total number of income groups is 11. 
Scheidel and Friesen (2009) provide a more detailed classification with 13 income groups  (see Table 
3). Although the notional dates for which the two social tables apply are different, it is clear from the 
texts that the underlying assumptions and the treatment of the Roman society are similar, and that it 
would be wrong to consider the tables as really applying to two different periods in Roman history.  
In essence, we are offered just one "story" of income segmentation in the high imperial period. 
Because it post-dates MLW and  provides estimates for  more social classes, in the rest of the 
analysis we shall use only the Scheidel-Friesen social table. 
 
 The social table created by Scheidel and Friesen produces a Gini of 41.18  Actual Gini  
amounts to about 90 percent of the maximum feasible Gini (41.3 vs. 45.7 Gini points). It thus falls 
within the expected “shaded” range (see  Figure 2).  As mentioned, the ratio between actual and 
maximum feasible Gini is called the "inequality extraction  ratio" (MLW, 2009) and denotes how 
much of feasible inequality the elite is able to "extract". If the ratio is 100 percent, then inequality is 
pushed to its utmost (feasible) limit.19 To give some historical examples: in Byzantium around year 
1000, the inequality extraction ratio was calculated as 94 percent, in England in 1209 as 69 percent, 
                                                          
18 Milanovic, Lindert and Williamson (2009), with 11 social classes, find a very similar Gini of 39.4. Both calculations 
assume that only inequality between groups matters, and inequality within groups is non-existent. This is obviously a 
simplifying assumption, rendered necessary by our lack of data for within-group inequality, but the bias need not be 
significant if the bulk of income segmentation is explained by social segmentations, and the groups included in the social 
table are salient.  
 
19 "Feasible" in this context means that society could theoretically continue as a "going concern": no people would die 
from hunger.  
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and in England and Wales in 1688 (based on Gregory King's social table) as 57 percent.20  Within 
this context, Roman inequality extraction ratio of around 90 percent is indeed high, but is not so 
excessive as to prevent physical reproduction of the population, and is less than in some 18th and 
19th centuries' colonies. But how about inequality in the period of dissolution and income decline?  
 
 Discussion. The implication of the upper- and lower-Gini bounds from Figure 2 is that 
inequality must have been substantially lower in the Late Empire as well as after the dissolution of 
the Western half of the Empire than in the mid-second century. If the Gini has been reduced from 
around 40 in the mid-second century to as low as 15 or even 12 by year 600 or 700, this represent an 
enormous reduction in inequality (albeit over a long time) for which we have no historical precedent. 
It is also true that the mean income at the same time might have been almost halved—another 
dramatic development. For this however  we do have modern analogs. During the Great Depression 
1929-33, real per capita income contracted by more than 30 percent in the US and more than 25 
percent in Germany. A more recent parallel is that of the transition from planned to market 
economy: Russia‟s GDP per capita shrunk by some 40 percent between 1989 and the trough of 
1998.  But neither of these income changes is really comparable to the Roman. First, the modern 
depressions took place over a much shorter period and were more in the nature of shocks than a 
sustained downward movement that seems to have characterized  the “demodernization” of the 
Roman Empire in Italy and Western Europe.   
 
 Second, and probably more importantly, income declines took place from the levels that 
were substantially above subsistence: American GDP per capita in 1929 and Russia‟s in 1989 were 
around $PPP 7,000, that is some 17 times greater than the subsistence. In the Roman Empire, the 
decline occurred from a level around twice the subsistence to a level barely above the subsistence. 
Now, the maximum feasible inequality approach (and common sense) tell us that a decline to the 
level close to the subsistence could not have been accompanied by more or less unchanged 
distribution of income because most of the population would have starved to death. Thus there 
would have been a massive population decline, independently of plagues that affected the Empire 
                                                          
20 See Milanovic, Lindert and Williamson (2009).  
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over that period. 21 It is also doubtful that--however rapacious the elite--such uneven distribution at 
such a low level of income could have been politically sustainable.  Therefore, the story of 
decreasing inequality pari passu (or close to pari passu) with decreasing mean income does seem to 
contain a fair degree of plausibility. Roman  decline in both average  income and inequality was, it 
seems, a unique phenomenon. Never before (obviously), and never after,  had people of different 
generations been faced by a movement from a reasonably complex and prosperous but highly 
unequal society to a much poorer, primitive and more equal.  
 
 This view of decreasing inequality in the Late Empire and afterwards is at odds with what 
most modern scholars argue. Starting with Rostovtzeff  (1926) and Walbank (1946), and more 
recently Cameron (1993), the dominant view has been that, at least in the Western half of the 
Empire, and very likely overall, there was an increase in inequality.22 This is linked to the emergence of 
the manorial system, based on natural economy,  where relatively few rich aristocrats were 
surrounded by numerous serfs. Limits on the movement of labor, obligation for sons to continue in 
fathers' profession etc., introduced by Constantine are all features of a proto-feudal society, 
departing strongly from a much more free market (and presumably less socially unequal), system 
under the early Empire. As Jongman (2008, p. 597) writes: "By the late empire, an ever smaller 
imperial elite controlled an ever larger share of the economy's surplus above subsistence". 23  
 
 Can this impressionistic view of high inequality be reconciled with our argument that the 
Gini, and thus measured inequality, was low? Yes, if we argue that the impressionistic view does not 
really concern itself with inequality as it is measured, but with the "inequality extraction ratio".  In 
very poor societies, where mean income is close to subsistence, total surplus, and thus measured 
inequality, cannot be very large. But all or most of that surplus can be controlled by a tiny elite. If 
one focuses on the latter,  he or she may see huge inequality even if, when measured by the Gini or 
                                                          
21 Not independent of wars though. Wars normally lead to reduction in income and population and are included as an 
integral part of the "story" here. Large scale diseases  are different. There is evidence that they may lead to an increase in 
mean income all the while population declines(or because  the population declines). 
 
22 “One striking feature of the 4th century is the tendency of landowners [in the Western half of the Empire] to amass 
estates and wealth on an enormous scale. This manifests itself particularly in relation to senatorial estates in the 4th and 
early 5th centuries"  (Cameron, 1993, p. 117). 
 
23 Or, "for all we know, later antiquity was the world of increased poverty for the masses, and ever larger fortunes for the 
rich" (Jongman, 2008,  p. 616). 
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other standard inequality measures, inequality is rather low. This is the situation similar to the one 
recently discussed by Williamson (2010) in relationship to Latin America after the European 
conquest: an apparently huge inequality (that is, a high inequality extraction ratio) coexisting with a 
low Gini.  Thus too, in the centuries of  the late antiquity,  the Euro-Mediterranean region might 
have featured the control of the entire surplus above subsistence by a military-aristocratic elite while 
conventionally measured inequality was --nevertheless-- low. 
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Table 3. Social table for the Roman empire around year 150 
 
Income (social) 
group 
Estimated average 
income in HS per 
capita p.a.) 
Income in 
wheat-
equivalents (kg, 
per capita, p.a.) 
 
Estimated 
population share 
 (in %) 
Average income in 
terms of subsistence 
Senatorial order 75000 200100 0.003 513.1 
Equestrian odder 10000 26680 0.114 68.4 
Decurional order 2500 6670 0.743 17.1 
Other wealthy 2500 6670 0.557 17.1 
Middle level 5 1350 3603 0.8 9.2 
Middle level 4 1105 2948 1.2 7.6 
Middle level 3 859 2293 1.8 5.9 
Middle level 2 614 1638 2.7 4.2 
Middle level 1 368 983 6.5 2.5 
Military 222 707 1.6 1.8 
Poor 3 215 573 19.0 1.5 
Poor 2 153 409 55.0 1.0 
Poor 1 92 246 10.0 0.6 
Total 265 707 100 1.8 
 Source: Based on Scheidel and Friesen (2009, Tables 6, 7 and 8). Wheat equivalents for classes  Middle level 5 and 
below are the mid-points of bracket estimates  given by Scheidel and Friesen (Table 7). Income in sesterces for the top 4 
classes from their Table 6, converted into wheat equivalents using the price of 2.5 HS per modius (HS 0.375 per kg). 
Wheat and HS equivalents for the military assumed equal to the overall mean (as per Scheidel and Friesen, Table 10). 
Population shares based on  Scheidel and Friesen's "optimistic" scenario.   
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 These results hold  some implications for the Malthusian view of the ancient world. The left 
panel  of Figure 3 shows the usual pattern of a single Malthusian wave with an increase in average 
per capita income from points A to B, which triggers population growth, and  with the latter in turn 
depressing mean income until it drops below subsistence and eventually returns to its previous level. 
At the end of the "wave", point C is characterized by the same mean income and the same (zero) net 
population growth as point A.24  Now, the measured inequality would at the initial point A be very 
low while the inequality extraction ratio would be very high (possibly close to 100 percent).  This 
would be a society composed of a multitude of people eking out a bare subsistence and a tiny elite 
collecting whatever  above the subsistence there exists. As the average income increases, measured 
inequality (shown in the right panel of Figure 3) also rises. This happens because the rich gain more 
than the poor and there is also some uneven trickle-down in the sense that not all the poor see their 
incomes rise equally. Some income gradation is thus introduced among the  lower ranks where 
previously there was none.  The extraction ratio must go down simply because the Malthusian 
movement assumes that some of the surplus is now received by the poor too (for otherwise they 
would not have procreated more). After point B, however, the movements reverses as the second 
stage of the wave undoes the effects of the first. Now,  the measured inequality decreases because 
relative incomes are reduced more among the rich while the poor in their downward movement are 
"caught"  by the immovable floor of subsistence;  the inequality extraction  ratio, on the contrary, 
goes up as the dwindling surplus is again captured by the rich only. It may be this second part of the 
"wave" (from points B to C) that we are capturing in the sixth to eight century, that is, a decreasing 
mean income, lower measured inequality, and a higher extraction ratio.    
  
                                                          
24 At C, population returns to its initial level so C is a replica of A.  
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Figure 3. Stylized Malthusian movement  
 
Mean income and population growth    Measured inequality and inequality  
        extraction ratio 
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5.  Was there a Roman middle class? 
 
 The next question is, what social structure is implied by the Scheidel-Friesen social table? 
The key question is whether in the Principate there was a class that could can be considered as 
“middle” or “middling”  class, and how important it was, compared both to what is our today‟s 
conception of the middle class, and to other historical preindustrial societies. 
 
 The definition of  the “middle class” is inherently elusive. Poverty can be defined in an 
absolute sense, invariant across societies and  times, as some physiological minimum necessary for 
survival.  But the middle class is entirely different. Being “middle”, it is “middle” with respect to 
something else. Hence, an absolute definition is much more questionable.  A relative definition, on 
the other hand,  runs the risk of bracketing under the title  of “middle” historically very different 
social groups. In addition, we do tend to introduce an implicit element of judgment as to what the 
“middle class” should include: it should not be “middle” only in terms of its position in income 
distribution, but must include “respectable”  level of income (and thus an element of “absolute” 
definition sneaks back in) and perhaps other characteristics like “acceptable” education. 25 In 
historically poor societies, these characteristics are unlikely to have been satisfied if we impose our 
today‟s conception of what the “middle class” should include. 
 
 Recently, a definition originally introduced  by Lester Thurow in 1987 (middle class are all 
individuals with income within 25 percent of the median) has been popular. We cannot apply it to 
our social table because our distribution is too rough, with more than a half of the population 
included in one, second from the bottom, income class (see Table 3). An alternative may be to use 
the recently proposed Ravallion‟s (2009) “developing world middle class”. He defines it as "those 
who are not deemed 'poor' by the standards of developing countries but are still poor by the 
standards of rich countries” (p. 4). This would include all people, living in developing countries, 
whose per capita income ranges  between  $PPP 2 and $PPP 13 per day.  According to this criterion, 
some 13 percent of the Roman population living around year 150 would be classified as “middle 
                                                          
25  Nancy Birdsall (2007, p. 4) defined global middle class as implicitly including some "acceptable" education level "to 
have the economic security associated with middle class status in an integrated global economy".  
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class”. 26 How important is it compared to some modern societies?  Using the same standard, in 
2005, India‟s middle class is estimated at 24.1 percent, China‟s at 61.8 percent, and that of Sub-
Saharan Africa at 25.8 percent. 27 Clearly, Rome, having been a very poor society by modern 
absolute-income standards, also had a small middle class by modern  standards:  only about half  as 
numerous (in the relative sense) as today‟s India or Sub-Saharan Africa. 
 
 But perhaps locating  Rome among some historical preindustrial societies might help  shed 
more light on its  middle class? Figure 4 shows the income shares of the top five or six percentiles of 
recipients in the  Roman Empire around year 150,  Byzantium around 1000,  England in 1290, and 
England in 1801-3. The estimations are based on the social tables for the  societies closest in time to 
Rome that we have, except for England and Wales 1801-03 which is used to highlight the difference 
between the ancient societies and those in the midst of the Industrial Revolution.  The dots, other 
than for the top percentile, refer to the actual  observations from the social tables. For the top 1 
percentile, the share is calculated by assuming that top incomes (those above the 1% threshold) 
follow a Pareto distribution. The approach is basically the same as recently used by Atkinson 
(2007).28   
 
 It is best to focus on the intercept at the point x=1 which gives the share of the top 
percentile in total income, and on the slope of the line. Relatively  modern societies with some 
middle class (like England and Wales in 1801-03) have a low intercept and a steeply rising line. The 
steep increase shows that the adjacent percentiles (people between the top,  and the fifth or sixth 
percentile) have relatively high incomes too. They represent what  may be termed the "upper middle 
class."  At the other end of the spectrum, there is Byzantium, where the intercept is high (the top 
percentile receives 30 percent of total income) but the slope of the line is flat. The implication is that 
the richest people are "cut off" from the rest of the population, not only because their income is so 
high, but because the neighboring percentiles are relatively poor. There is there much less of an 
                                                          
26 We convert incomes into international dollars, by pricing subsistence at $PPP 350 per capita (at 2005 prices).  
27 Ravallion (2009, Table 3, p. 27). 
 
28 The estimation procedure is explained in detail in Appendix 2. There I  list several caveats necessitated by the fact that 
our social tables are different from the usual income distribution data sources. 
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"upper middle class"  than in the English case. Societies like Byzantium can be considered  "hyper-
elitist". At the extreme, as in our derivation of the maximum feasible inequality, the line could 
combine a very high intercept and a barely upward-sloping portion for the percentiles >1. In such a 
society, only the top percentile is different from the rest while all the others are either at the same, or 
similar, income level. In contrast to a "hyper-elitist" society, Roman income distribution shows  a 
much smaller share of the top (13.7 percent of total income), and a more steeply rising line. The 
Roman distribution is not dissimilar from the one for England in 1290 except that there is (not 
surprisingly) greater evidence of a substantial upper middle class in Rome than in the medieval 
England. Overall, the top 5 percent of income recipients received around 30 percent of total income 
in Rome. This can be contrasted with a quarter of total income they receive in the modern United 
States and United Kingdom, 27 percent in modern Chile and a third in Brazil.29  Thus, compared to 
a couple of ancient societies for which we have the data, Rome exhibits some evidence of a more 
"modern" pattern of income  distribution, characterized by less extreme wealth at the top, and a 
reasonably-sized  upper middle class.  
  
                                                          
29 Calculated from World Income Distribution (WYD) database, available at 
http://econ.worldbank.org/projects/inequality 
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Figure 4. The top five or six percentiles of income distribution and their shares in total income 
 
 
Source: Calculated from the Roman social table (Table 3 above), and social tables provided in MLW (2009). Pareto 
interpolation used to estimate the share of the top 1 percent. Dots refer to the income shares actually observed in social 
tables.    
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6. Conclusions 
 
 Quantification of history is important because it sets the numerical limits to what we believe, 
presses us to come with different and better estimates, and ensures consistency in our thinking. For 
example, if we find that inequality is greater than implied by the inequality possibility frontier which 
charts maximum levels of inequality for each level of average income, then we either have to revise 
our estimates of inequality, or of mean income, or look more carefully whether the society might not 
have been an extremely exploitative one, not allowing even subsistence income for all of its 
members. It is in this spirit that one should consider the quantification for the period 1-700 
attempted here.  Similarly--as often pointed out--quantified study of economic history is not solely 
about the past: in principle, it should allow us also to address better the contemporary issues such as 
factors that stimulate economic growth, the role of institutions in developments, the rise and fall of 
economic power of nations.  
 
 As mentioned in the introduction, the paper should be also considered as a part of a larger 
work whose objective would be a reconstruction of global inequality between nations and peoples 
for most of the recorded history in the Common Era. The project can probably advance more easily 
if the first level of analysis is conducted for separate regions (say, Euro-Mediterranean, Asia, Africa) 
which could be later put together. For the same reason, it is probably also better to express average 
incomes in terms of regional subsistence minima. This allows for a much greater flexibility; both 
because we do not need, at this stage, to set a dollar amount to subsistence, and secondly, by leaving 
it relatively vague, we can allow for the fact that the cost of subsistence may differ between the 
regions, depending on their climate, fertility of soil, type of food that is consumed by the poor etc. 
Then the fact that in one region subsistence is more expensive (whatever being more "expensive" 
may mean in an era where the regions hardly engaged in any economic intercourse) should not be a 
problem at all. Fundamentally, real income is expressed in how much above subsistence it allows 
people to live. Whether reaching that subsistence is "cheap" (say in warmer climates) is immaterial.   
 
 Combining various studies of  the Roman economy covering the period of up to late 
antiquity  we conjecture that mean income was at its peak already at the time of the Augustan 
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Principate, or at the latest around mid-second century. After that,  it would seem that the decline 
was particularly rapid until around 300, and then slowed down. However, by that point the Euro-
Mediterranean region was not, on average, much richer than the minimum needed for survival;  thus 
the "floor" of subsistence might have prevented further sharp income declines. At the same time, 
regional income differences diminished. Peninsular Italy, which in the fist century, was the richest 
region declined the most. On the other hand, Levant and the Aegean region did not experience 
significant declines in average income until relatively late, that is, only around 600 or even later. 
Using a social table that gives income distribution by social  class for  the Roman Empire around 
150, the Gini is estimated at 41 points, which is about the same level as in today's United States and 
the European Union. 30 Measured by regional income inequality,  the Empire was certainly more 
homogeneous than the European Union today although less so than the United States (see 
Appendix 3).  
 
 But the decline in the average Euro-Mediterranean income must have been, we argue, 
accompanied by a decreasing, and not increasing, inequality simply because a low level of average 
income could not sustain a very high inequality while at the same time ensuring reproduction of all 
population. To allow for the persistence of high inequality (that is, as it was around 150) one must 
argue that a non-trivial percentage of the population earned less than subsistence, and thus that the 
population must have shrunk on account of poverty alone.  This seems unlikely. We believe that it is 
possible to reconcile the conjectured low measured inequality with the impression of a high post-300 
inequality because the latter may, in  reality, refer to the speculation, felling or finding that the elite 
was appropriating much more of the surplus above subsistence than before. The inequality 
extraction ratio might have indeed been going up while the conventionally measured inequality was 
trending down. Those who observed poverty of most contrasted to the wealth of very few tended to 
conclude that inequality must have unambiguously risen. But they might have failed to account for 
the fact that the numerous poor were  now all equally impoverished, and that measured inequality 
(calculated across all individuals) could not, on that account alone, have been very high. 31  
 
                                                          
30 And incidentally, Russia and China too(see  Appendix 3). 
31 Obviously, if one measures inequality by focusing only on the top and the bottom, such inequality could have been 
very high. But more correctly, and appropriately, inequality is measured by an index that takes income of everyone into 
account.  
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 The analysis conducted here does not address at all the “why”, that is why a more 
sophisticated and richer society was replaced by a less sophisticated and poorer one. It does not deal 
with “the fall of Rome”. It does not either deal with that ultimate “what would have been”, the 
question of whether the Euro-Mediterranean civilization of late antiquity could have evolved right 
then  into a civilization of commercial capitalism without going through a ten-century long “detour”. 
32 But by providing some conjectural estimates of income and inequality, it may circumscribe a bit 
better the terms of both debates.  
 
  
  
                                                          
32 Although that question seems to me to have been answered in the negative by the lack of similar evolution by the 
Eastern half of the empire, at least until the 12th century, after which it merely struggled to survive.   
31 
 
 
 
Appendix 1. Estimated regional population, years 1-700 
(in 000s) 
 
Year 1 14 200 300 400 500 520 600 700 
North Africa 4200 4200 4500 4347 4200 3995 3975 3800 3750 
North & Central Italy 7000 7000 7000 5916 5000 4183 4109 3500 3700 
Roman Britain 700 700 700 748 800 693 683 600 600 
Aegean world 11050 13050 12550 11723 10950 9591 9464 8400 8900 
Levant 7225 8700 8450 7354 6400 5713 5649 5100 5700 
Gaul and Iberia 10750 11050 13000 10512 8500 5376 5135 3400 3950 
Total 40925 44700 46200 40600 35850 29551 29015 24800 26600 
Source: For years 1, 200, 400, 600,  Maddison (2008, Table 1.3, p. 37). For year 14, Maddison (2008, p. 54). For years 
300, 500, 520 interpolation from Maddison (2008, Table 1.3). For year 700, calculated from McEvady and Jones (1978). 
Maddison‟s regional classification modified to fit Ward-Perkins‟ classification. Definitions are as follows. Sicily, Sardinia, 
Corsica, Baetica, Narbonensis and other Gaul are Gaul and Iberia; Greece, Danubian Provinces and Asia Minor are 
Aegean world;  Tunisia, Libya, Algeria and Morocco are North Africa; Egypt, Greater Syria and Cyprus are Levant; 
Peninsular Italy is North and Central Italy. Data for Roman Britain (not included in Maddison) are from McEvady and 
Jones (1978, p. 43) which is also the source for all of Maddison‟s population data.  
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Appendix 2: Derivation of the top 1 percent income share 
Define H(y) = cumulative percentage of people with incomes higher than y. We can also call 
it the "headcount of the rich" by analogy with the similar cumulative headcount of the poor, at the 
other end of the distribution.  
 If H(y) follows a Pareto distribution then: 
(1) aAyyH )(  
where a=Pareto constant. Rewriting (1) as 
(1a)  yaAyH ln')(ln   
we can see that a plays the role of a "guillotine" such that each percent increase in income "cuts" the 
percentage of people with that income and greater by a percent. 33  If we do not have individual-level 
data but income distribution tables with grouped data as here (fractiles of income distribution), then 
y should ideally be the lower bound of the income interval. There are two differences between these 
requirements and the data we have. First, we have only social classes arranged by their mean 
incomes and population shares.  In other words, we have the percentages of people with an average 
income and do not know lower or upper bounds of their income ranges. Second, there are very 
likely “leakages”--namely people from lower (mean-poorer) social groups whose actual incomes are 
higher and should be part of the top (and the reverse). This problem is specific to the type of data 
we have here. These two departures of our data from the usual way income distribution statistics are 
presented (when given in a grouped form) should be kept in mind.  
Now, let us define G(y) = total income of those with incomes above y divided by total 
population N;  if it follows a Pareto distribution, then (see Atkinson, 2007, Box, p.27). 
(2) )1(
1
)( 

 aAy
a
a
yG  
Also, by definition, yh = mean income of people with income greater than y, and  
                                                          
33 Percentage change in the headcount ratio H(y) is equivalent to the percentage change in people with income greater 
than, or equal to, y.   
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For example, if the Pareto constant is 2, then the mean income of those with income greater than y, 
will be 2y. 
Using (1) and (2), we can link G(y) and H(y): 
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Write the expression (4) to the exponent a: 
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where Ko = constant, and we use expression (1).  
Now this means that 
HaKHaKGa ln)1(ln)1(lnln 0   
where the constant K=ln Ko. Then, 
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The ratio between the change in H and change in G is: 
(5) 
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The share of total income received by people whose income is greater than y, s(y), is equal to: 
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(6) 
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where μ=overall mean income.   
We  transform (5) 
(8) 
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 Expression (8) is the relationship that we fit in order to get the Pareto constant and to 
interpolate for the values that we do not have in the original data. For example, in the case of Rome, 
the actual data are:  H1=1.42 and H2=0.86. H1 people receive s(y)= 17.54 percent of total income. 
And H2 people receive s(y) =  12.29  percent of total income.  
Thus,  
401.1
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499.0
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

 
From which we find the Pareto constant a=3.49.  
The top 1 percent receive the share in-between the two shares. To find the income share of the top 
1 percent, denoted by s(y*), we use (7) again. 
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And thus s(y*)=13.67 percent.  
We obtain the same result if we go from the other direction: 
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35 
 
Appendix 3. Break-down of Gini in Roman Empire and modern societies 
 
 United 
States 
Roman 
Empire 
Russia European 
Union 
China 
Inequality between units 8 11 20 23 24 
Inequality among people within 
units 
33 30 22 18 18 
Total inequality among people 41 41 42 41 42 
Approximate share of between 
inequality (in %) 
20 27 48 57 57 
Note: number of units 50 14 89 27 29 
 states regions suibjects 
of feder. 
nations provinces 
Note: Roman inequality calculated from 14 regions from Maddison (2007, p. 54); year 14. For modern societies, own 
calculations from surveys from around 2005 (World Income Distribution, WYD). Societies ranked from left to right 
according to the importance of "between" inequality. 
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